The student movement that challenged Aleksandar Vucinqi’s 14-year-old power has brought a significant change to Serbia’s political scene.

With promises to fight corruption, restore rule of law and free institutions from party influence, the Student List represents an alternative to the model of government so far. However, when it comes to Kosovo, the differences between this movement and Vuciqi are much less clear.

For Kosovo, the establishment of the Student List raises a fundamental question: Can power change in Belgrade bring about changing Serbia’s policy towards the state of Kosovo, or is it primarily about an effort to democratise Serbia, without reviewing its traditional positions on regional issues?

The Student List was politically shaped by mass protests following the November 1st 2024 tragedy in Novi Sad, where the collapse of the railway station’s shelter caused the death of 16 people.

The event sparked a wave of discontent against Serbian institutions, while students and protesters accused power of corruption, lack of transparency and irresponsibly.

From a centralised protest movement without leadership, students managed to create a political alternative, including on their academic, professional, entrepreneurial and public figures list.

Unlike traditional opposition parties, which for years failed to seriously challenge Vuciqi’s dominance, the Student List built support on demands for institutional responsibility and changing the way government is ruling.

But while differences in domestic politics are evident, the Kosovo issue remains one of the points where the continuation of Serbian state policy can be stronger than change.

In the 25 October elections, the Student List marked a historic victory over Vuciqi’s political force, which publicly acknowledged defeat. But this result does not automatically imply changing Belgrade’s stance on Kosovo.

In May 2026, the student movement published a memorandum for Kosovo, in which it named that inseparable part of Serbia and opposed its independence. The document sought a solution in co-operation with international organisations, but within the Serbian constitutional framework.

This stance does not differ essentially from the official position Serbia has held during Vuciqi’s rule. Both sides oppose recognising Kosovo’s independence, though they have differences in how they present the solution to the issue.

Even in the Student List election programme, opposition to Kosovo’s membership in international organisations is envisioned, the preservation of Serbian education and health institutions in Kosovo, as well as the demand of broad autonomy for the Serb community.

Within the Student List, however, there have also been attitudes that leave room for another negotiating approach.

During a television debate in RTS, the representative of the list, Aleksandar Bauca, said Kosovo’s status is a matter of negotiations. That statement prompted Ana Brnabiqi’s reaction from the Vuciqi camp, which insisted that Kosovo’s status cannot be negotiated.

This distinction is important, but it is no evidence that the Student List is willing to recognise Kosovo’s independence. On the contrary, its public documents continue to rely on the Constitution of Serbia.

The biggest difference between the Student List and Vuciqi lies in domestic politics.

The student movement promises fighting corruption, investigating illegally acquired property, reforming institutions and creating a specialised police structure in the service of the prosecution.

Its 11-point programme aims to limit party influence over institutions, strengthen public responsibility and restore citizens’ trust in the state system.

Another difference is the way political organization works. While Vuciqi’s power was focused around its image, the Student List was built on a more decentralised model, with candidates proposed through university structures and with a large number of previously inexperienced professionals in top political positions.

However, it remains to be seen whether this model of organization can function even during government.

As for Russia, differences are also more limited than could be expected from a movement that requires change of power.

The Student List has declared that Serbia should not impose sanctions on the Russian Federation, arguing that restrictive measures are not necessarily effective instruments for resolving political and security crises.

Thus, even in terms of Moscow, the movement has signalled continuation in one of the main policies followed by Vuciqi.

Meanwhile, in relations with the European Union, the Student List has not presented an unconditional orientation towards integration. Its representatives have cited the possibility of a referendum on EU membership, while experts have warned that this approach could complicate the integration process.

For Kosovo, one of the possible changes relates to the way Belgrade will deal with Kosovo Serbs and political structures that represent them.

During Vuciqi’s rule, the Serbian List has been Belgrade’s main political partner in Kosovo. Critics of this party have repeatedly raised concerns about the concentration of power, lack of transparency and control over local institutions.

Representatives of Kosovo Serbs who support the student movement have demanded that the Serb community have more autonomy in everyday decision-making, without depending on Belgrade’s political orders.

The change of power in Serbia could pave the way for the investigation into how the Serbian List managed funds coming from the Serbian budget. However, such an investigation remains the possibility, not the confirmed policy of the future government.

Another important issue for Kosovo is the responsibility for the September 24th 2023 attack on Banjska, where Kosovo Police Sergeant Africa Bulnjak was killed.

The change of power in Belgrade could create new political circumstances for dealing with the criminal responsibility of the suspects, including Milan Radojcicin. But so far there is no clear and verified pledge of the Student List for his extradition to Kosovo.

Here is the difference between expectations for democratic change in Serbia and expectations for policy change towards Kosovo.

A government promising more independent institutions, fighting corruption and responsibility for officials can create conditions for a more transparent approach to relations with Kosovo. But these reforms do not guarantee change Serbia’s position on its status.

For Pristina, the main test of the future government will be not only rhetoric for democracy and rule of law, but concrete actions respect for dialogue agreements, attitude towards parallel structures, handling the attack in Banjska, and readiness for peaceful and lasting relations.

The Student List has promised change in the way Serbia is governed, but has not promised to change its fundamental position on Kosovo’s independence.

Therefore, the students’ victory marks a turning point in Serbian domestic politics, but the question remains open whether it will also mark a new chapter in Kosovo relations. /Telegraphy.