The Supreme Court of Kosovo has falsely filed a complaint against the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council’s decision to oust Blerim Isufaj from the position of chief Special Prosecutor. Although claims had been filed on serious procedural violations, predetermined decision making, lack of evidence and violation of the right to be heard, the Supreme has not entered their assessment. The court has found that the KPK’s ruling is not of disciplinary nature, but administrative, so its legality should be considered in another judicial procedure.
The signal paper has secured the decision of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, A.A.n.40/2026, on October 27th 2026, through which it has been decided over Blerim Isufaj’s complaint against the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council’s decision of October 2, 2026.

The decision was made by college consisting of judges Delushe Halimi, chairman Faton Ademi and Nenad Laziić, members.
In the decision-making device, the Supreme Court has ruled that the complaint filed against the departure of the chief prosecutor of the Special Prosecutor’s office be dismissed as illegal.
But what makes this decision of particular interest is the judicial reasoning upon which the Supreme Court has supported its conclusion, making a distinction between leaving a leadership position and pronunciation of a disciplinary measure.
Four reasons that KKP had decided to leave
On October 2nd, 2026, the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council had decided on the departure of Blerim Isufaj from the position of chief Special Prosecutor.
The decision was based on four Council findings, the Special Prosecutor’s Mismanagement, non-competition in the exercise of the chief prosecutor’s position, failure to carry out leadership duties and non-fulfilling performance standards respectively.
According to the KKP, each of these circumstances, even taken separately, constituted a legal cause for departure from office.
The council was supported, among other things, in performance reports and in the comparison analysis of the prosecution’s efficiency for the period 20232025.
The Supreme decision is also reflected in the KPK’s conclusion that the Special Prosecutor was listed as the country’s lowest efficiency prosecutor during this period.
However, Isufaj’s departure from the leadership position had not brought a break to his post as state prosecutor, which he continues to exercise at the Special Prosecutor.
Claims of decision prepared in advance and denial of the right to be heard
Through lawyer Artan Qerkeyni, Isufaj had opposed the legality of the KPK decision, presenting a considerable number of claims.
The claim was filed that the decision was written before decision making was carried out, while the complainers had been denied the right to listen.
It was also claimed that the decision did not enable the verification of quorum, composition and voting in the Council.
The complaint also raised issues related to the impartiality of the decision – making body and possible conflict of interest.
One of the main objections was to the performance assessment, which Isufaj claimed had not received final form.
According to the complaint, the assessment could not be treated as a negative assessment, nor could it automatically serve as a basis for leaving office.
In his objections, Isufaj had also raised the issue of a lack of individualisation of responsibility, claiming that systemic problems recorded in the functioning of the Special Prosecutor could not be attributed to him personally without concrete evidence and without the definition of the cause link.
He had also argued that the Council’s own statistics did not support the conclusions drawn for its performance, and that some of the findings for mismanagement were not based on individualised facts.
Through the complaint, it was required that the Supreme judge claim its competence, change the KPK’s decision, and allow the term as chief prosecutor to continue. Alternatively, an annulment of the decision was required and the return of the matter to review.
KKPK rejected Supreme competence
In response to the complaint, the Prosecutorial Council had declined to have the Supreme Court decide on the case through the initial procedure on disciplinary complaints.
According to the KKP, the decision to remove Isufaj was not a disciplinary decision, neither in form nor in content.
The council had argued that the decision was taken on the basis of Article 22, paragraph 5 of the Law for the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council, which recognises this institution the competence of the chief prosecutor’s departure from leadership positions under legally defined circumstances.
Consequently, the KKP had estimated that the right path for opposing the decision was the procedure of administrative conflict, not direct complaint to the Supreme Court under the Law for Discipline of Judges and Prosecutors.
This argument was accepted by the Supreme Court college.
The Supreme One makes a crucial distinction between turning away from position and discipline
In reasoning about the decision, the Supreme Court noted that the legal nature of a decision is not determined solely by the consequences it produces.
According to the college, to determine which judicial institution is competent, the legal basis of the decision, content, and procedure in which it is taken should be considered.
The court has estimated that Article 22, paragraph 5, of the Law for the Prosecutorial Council, gives the KKP a special competence for the removal of chief prosecutors from leadership positions due to performance, mismanagement, noncompetency or failure to perform tasks.
According to the Supreme One, exercising this component is not the same as developing a disciplinary procedure against a prosecutor.
The court has clarified that the disciplinary responsibility is regulated by a special law specifying violations, procedures, sanctions and legal means for their opposition.
On the list of disciplinary sanctions stipulated by that law is not provided as a special measure of departure from the chief prosecutor’s leadership position because of the performance assessment.
Consequently, the college has found that the KKP’s decision to oust Isufaj cannot be treated as a disciplinary decision only to the fact that he has lost leadership.
Why did the Supreme One not examine claims of wrongdoing?
This is also the most important element of decision – making.
Isufaj had demanded that the Supreme Court examine the legality of the KPK decision, including claims of procedural violations, wrong performance assessment, lack of evidence and disproportionateness.
However, the Supreme Court has estimated that its direct competence, according to Article 15 of the Law for Disciplinary Responsibilities, is limited to considering complaints against decisions of disciplinary nature.
For this reason, the Supreme One has not decided whether Isufaj’s claims are based or baseless. She has found that complaints could not be considered in this procedure.
This difference is essential to the understanding of the decision, as throwing the complaint as illegal does not constitute judicial confirmation of the integrity of the KPK ruling.
At the same time, the ruling is not even a conclusion that the KKP has acted contrary to the law.
The issue of legitimacy of the decision remains divided by that of the tribunal’s competence that should be considered.
What is the legal way after the Supreme decision?
At the conclusion of the argument, the Supreme Court has found that the decision to remove the chief prosecutor from the leadership has administrative character.
For this reason, according to her, the legality of the KPK decision could undergo judicial control in the procedure of administrative conflict, before competent judges under legislation in force.
The Supreme has not decided to return Isufaj to the chief prosecutor’s position, nor to cancel the prosecutorial Council’s decision.
It is limited to the agreement that the complaint filed directly in this court, on the basis of provisions for disciplinary responsibility, is not a legal means for this kind of decision.
Thus, the October 27th ruling does not finally settle the dispute on the legality of Isufaj’s departure, but stipulates that he cannot be considered by the Supreme in the procedure chosen by the complainer.
With this ruling, the KKP’s decision to leave the leadership position remains in force, while the possibility of judicial control of its legitimacy lies with the procedure of the administrative conflict.
The Supreme Court’s decision, beyond concrete circumstances, brings a significant judicial clarification on the difference between the disciplinary responsibility of prosecutors and the jurisdiction of the Prosecutorial Council to assess and decide on the continuation of the governing mandates in the prosecutorial system.
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