The victory of the Student List could weaken Aleksandar Vuciqi’s personal power model, but will produce an earlier strategic turn in Serbia’s foreign policy. Persistent attitudes towards Kosovo, Russia and NATO show that new Belgrade can change the way it communicates with the West, without giving up the goals that have defined Serbian policy for more than a decade.

For Kosovo, this could mean a dialogue with less public tension, but not necessarily more readiness for normalisation.

The absence of a classic party structure, uncertainty about future leadership and limited institutional experience can make the transition more difficult than the election campaign itself. And the students’ victory is not only a change of parliamentary majority, it is a challenge to a system where political power, state institutions, the media and relations with international partners were concentrated largely around a single figure. And the dissolution of this model does not mean that with it the interests that have oriented Serbia’s foreign policy will disappear.

For Kosovo, the outcome of elections in Serbia should be read more carefully than as an automatic opportunity for improving relations. There are no signs of a fundamental change of attitude towards Kosovo’s independence in the programme and the until-day statements of representatives of the Student List. On the contrary, their position remains based on Serbia’s Constitution and on opposing Kosovo’s membership in international organisations.

In a post-election statement, Student List candidate Dejan Shoskiq referred to Serbia’s Constitution and UN Security Council Resolution 1244, repeating Belgrade’s official position on Kosovo. Meanwhile, between the positions of old power and new ones, there is no substantial difference to Kosovo’s status.

This is a signal Pristina should not ignore. The student movement won the political battle mainly through requirements for fighting corruption, institutional responsibility and reform of the state, rather than through a programme to resolve the issue with Kosovo. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that power change will automatically produce a change of Belgrade’s policy towards Pristina.

In some respects, the approach of the new government may even be more difficult to predict. Vuciqi had built a system where important political decisions often focused on his office, enabling him to control the pace of negotiations and convey various messages to Brussels, Washington and Moscow. A new government, with more heterogeneous composition and without a single dominant figure, may have less room for political compromises that do not enjoy support within the parliamentary majority.

This is especially important for the Kosovo dialogue. The European Union has made it clear that the change of leaders does not abolish obligations taken by the parties and that the agreements reached, including the Ohrid Road Agreement, remain part of the process.

For Kosovo, the first test will not be if the new government uses a more moderate language, but if it is willing to implement existing agreements, give up obstacles to Kosovo’s international integration and accept a process leading to normalisation of relations. Until then, changing tone should not be confused with changing attitudes.

COMM SOVA

If there is room for reviewing economic agreements in China’s report, much greater restrictions are being made with Russia. Belgrade continues to rely on Moscow for the Kosovo issue on the UN Security Council, while energy dependence and political and social ties make a quick break difficult.

The first statements by representatives of the Student List show there is no plan for imposing sanctions on Russia. Jovo Bakic has declared that Serbia will not change its policy towards Moscow, while the stance on military neutrality and rejection of NATO membership remains part of the movement’s programme.

This puts the future government in a difficult position against the European Union. Brussels has linked Serbia’s progress towards membership with harmonising its foreign and security policy with that of the EU, including its stance on Russian aggression in Ukraine. Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos has warned that without this harmonisation Serbia’s progress in the integration process will be very difficult.

So the new government will face an election that cannot be avoided for a long time, that is to seek the economic and political benefits of approaching the EU, while maintaining an external policy that in some of the most important issues conflicts with Brussels’ positions.

However, the internal factor is not to be overlooked. The Student List is a broad movement, co-existing different political positions, including nationalists and voters traditionally close to Russia. A decision on sanctions against Moscow could create divisions in the new majority and weaken the legitimacy of the government at a time when it should prove that it is in a state of government.

In dealing with China, the most obvious change can occur. During Vuciqi’s rule, co-operation with Beijing became one of the pillars of Serbian foreign policy, including investments in infrastructure, industry, mines and technology. Through intergovernmental agreements and large projects, Chinese companies gained significant position in the Serbian economy.

But here is also one of the problems that brought the student movement to the center of politics. The fallout at the Novi Sad railway station, where 16 people lost their lives in November 2024, became a symbol of demands for transparency, responsibility and investigation of public contracts. The renovation project included a Chinese consortium and is already part of the debate on institutional responsibility and supervision of foreign investments.

In this regard, the Student List requires review of contracts and public spending, as well as investigating cases of corruption that may have been put aside during previous governance. This makes it expected even greater control of Chinese companies’ projects, especially in the areas of procurement, environmental standards and working conditions.

However, a break from China is not a realistic scenario in the short term. Investments, trade agreements and infrastructure projects are part of the Serbian economy, while Beijing continues to be important to Belgrade on the Kosovo issue. The most likely is for the relationship to pass from a partnership built mainly through political ties among leaders in a co-operation where the new government requires more transparency and institutional control.

For Kosovo, it has a direct significance. Even if Belgrade reviews economic agreements with China, there is no indication it will give up Beijing’s diplomatic support on the Kosovo status issue. On the contrary, as long as non-recognition remains Serbia’s strategic goal, China will continue to matter to its diplomacy.

BA EVROPIAN AND U.S.A.

The Student List’s victory gives the European Union an opportunity to reopen reports with Belgrade, but also places it in the face of a test of its policy credibility towards Serbia. For years, Brussels has been co-operating with the Vuciqi government, despite fierce criticism of the state of democracy, media freedom and the concentration of power. Now, support for the new government will have to be measured with concrete results in rule of law, the independence of institutions and the fight against corruption.

That is why the student victory should not be seen as an automatic victory for pro-European orientation. The movement has expressed readiness for continuing European integration, but also maintains anti-varicial positions against Russia, against NATO membership and against Kosovo independence. These contradictions will determine the limits of approaching the West.

For Washington, a more institutional-oriented government can create opportunities for greater co-operation in security, energy and technology. But even the US will face the same dilemma, how to support democratic change in Serbia without relating the importance of normalising relations with Kosovo and leaving Russian influence intact in the region.

Belgrade’s influence is not limited to Kosovo. For years, Vuciqi’s relations with Serbian leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially with Milorad Dodik, as well as reports with Viktor Orban’s Hungary, have been part of a regional policy built on political alliances and shared interests.

A new government may seek less confrontational relations with neighbours and rely more on institutional co-operation. Such an approach could affect reports with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Croatia. But even here, rhetorical change must be followed by changing political practice.

For Kosovo, this is important because regional stability does not depend solely on bilateral dialogue. It is also influenced by the way Belgrade behaves to Kosovo institutions, Serbs living in neighbouring countries, and political structures operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A less confrontational Serbia could create room for lowering tensions, but only if this is reflected in concrete actions and not only in diplomatic communication.

Beyond foreign policy, the Student List must prove that it can control institutions that have been operating under SNS’s domination for 14 years. On 29 October, the movement called for the resignation of senior police officials, intelligence and judicial services, while simultaneously seeking to preserve documentation and investigate alleged corruption cases. And of course, it must not forget the case ‘%Banjska, which remains to be seen whether to take action against chief criminal Milan Radojic along with his group, who carried out the terrorist attack in northern Kosovo.

That is why the removal of Vuciqi should not match the conclusion of the political model he represented. His party remains an important parliamentary force, while the administration, security institutions and political networks built over the years do not disappear with an election result.

For Kosovo, the outcome is more complicated than waiting for a new Belgrade. A government that may be more open to reforms, less focused on a leader and more cautious in reports with the West is not necessarily a government that will change Kosovo policy. On the contrary, if you maintain the same goals for non-recognition, opposition to membership in international organisations, and support in Russia and China, then change will be mostly in the method.

Serbia may enter a post-Vucinqi period, but that does not mean it is entering even a period following Vuciqi’s policy towards Kosovo. This is the difference that Pristina, Brussels and Washington should take into account during the assessment of the future government in Belgrade.

The real evidence will not be as soon as the new language of power changes, but if it is willing to change decisions, practices and policies that have maintained the conflict with Kosovo unresolved. /Telegraphy/